Consumer Internet & Quick Commerce

Blinkit makes money, Instamart loses more, Zepto waits: quick commerce is now a scale game

The same business model produced a profit at one company and a widening loss at another in the same quarter. The difference is density, and it is getting harder to buy.

By Published 6 min read
In this story
  1. The quarter in numbers
  2. Why growth made Instamart's loss bigger
  3. Density is the real moat
  4. One accounting change to keep in mind
  5. Zepto: the cost of not being first or second
  6. What to watch next
  7. The bottom line
  8. Sources

The short answer: in the July–September 2026 quarter, Blinkit turned a profit on an adjusted basis while Swiggy's Instamart lost more money than in the previous quarter, and Zepto chose to wait rather than list at a lower valuation. All three run broadly the same model of small warehouses delivering in minutes. What separates them is scale per store, and that advantage is now compounding.

This piece uses the companies' own shareholder letters and filings, and reports from Business Standard, BusinessLine, Inc42 and Moneycontrol. Our calculations are labelled as such.

The quarter in numbers

Q2 FY27 (Jul–Sep 2026) Blinkit (Eternal) Instamart (Swiggy)
Net order value (NOV) ₹20,940 crore ₹6,594 crore
NOV growth, year on year 79.3% 34.8%
NOV growth, quarter on quarter 22.2% 13.4%
Dark stores at quarter end 2,751 1,240
Net stores added in the quarter 308 69
Adjusted EBITDA ₹184 crore profit ₹895 crore loss

Sources: Eternal Q2 FY27 shareholders' letter; Swiggy Q2 FY27 shareholder letter. Definitions of NOV and adjusted EBITDA are each company's own, so treat comparisons as directional.

Two numbers deserve a closer look.

First, Blinkit's profit is not a one-off. Eternal says Blinkit's adjusted EBITDA margin improved for the sixth quarter in a row, reaching 0.9% of NOV. A year earlier the same business lost ₹156 crore.

Second, Instamart's quarter was actually its best growth quarter in a while. Swiggy says NOV grew 13.4% sequentially, against 2.5% in Q1. Orders rose 29.3% year on year to about 130 million, and monthly transacting users reached 14.8 million. The loss widened anyway.

Why growth made Instamart's loss bigger

Swiggy is unusually candid about this in its letter. It says Instamart reached contribution break-even in May 2026 and then chose to spend to accelerate growth, while staying within a guided contribution-margin range of zero to -1% of GOV. Contribution margin, which looks at the money left from each order after the direct costs of fulfilling it, landed at -1.0% of GOV for the quarter.

In other words, Swiggy is deliberately buying growth at the edge of its own guardrail. That can be rational if the extra orders build habits that later become profitable. But it means each new rupee of Instamart growth still costs money at the order level, while each new rupee of Blinkit growth now adds to profit.

There is a quieter detail too. Swiggy says its take rate (what it keeps from each order) fell by 140 basis points quarter on quarter. Lower take rates usually mean more discounting, lower fees, or a mix shift. Either way, it is the opposite of what a business heading to profit wants to see.

Density is the real moat

Here is a rough calculation of our own. Divide each company's quarterly NOV by its quarter-end store count:

  • Blinkit: ₹20,940 crore ÷ 2,751 stores ≈ ₹7.6 crore of NOV per store in the quarter.
  • Instamart: ₹6,594 crore ÷ 1,240 stores ≈ ₹5.3 crore of NOV per store.

That puts Blinkit about 43% ahead per store. The method is crude: new stores have not had a full quarter, and the two companies define NOV slightly differently. But the direction matches Swiggy's own operating data, which shows Instamart at 1,192 orders per dark store per day, a big improvement from about 1,025 a year earlier, and still a business that loses money.

Why does this matter so much? A dark store's costs are mostly fixed: rent, pickers, power, cold chain and inventory. Every extra order spreads those costs thinner. Higher volume also brings better terms from brands, more advertising revenue (brands pay to be seen inside the app), and the confidence to stock more expensive non-grocery items. Swiggy itself points to non-grocery selection and bigger baskets as the reason its average order value rose.

Each of those benefits is larger for the bigger player, and each one funds the next round of expansion. That is why the gap tends to widen, not close. Blinkit added 308 net stores in the quarter. Instamart added 69.

One accounting change to keep in mind

Eternal's adjusted revenue grew 76% year on year, but the company notes that like-for-like growth was 58%. The difference comes from a shift to owning inventory in quick commerce, which records the full value of goods sold as revenue rather than just a commission. It flatters revenue growth, so NOV is the better measure of how fast the business is actually growing. It is also why we compare NOV, not revenue, above.

Zepto: the cost of not being first or second

Zepto, the third large player, is privately held, so it does not publish quarterly letters. What is public is its IPO path:

  • It filed an updated draft prospectus (UDRHP) on 8 June 2026, for a fresh issue of up to ₹8,010 crore plus an offer for sale of about 11.35 crore shares by existing investors.
  • On 30 July 2026, Business Standard (via PTI) and Inc42 reported that it had paused the IPO and would raise about ₹1,000 crore in a pre-IPO round at around a $4.5 billion valuation, down from the $7 billion it was valued at in October 2025.
  • Moneycontrol reported that domestic mutual funds had offered a valuation of only $2.5–3 billion, and that the company's quarterly cash burn was around ₹700 crore.
  • Zepto confirmed the pause in a statement, saying it would update its draft for newer financials and list within the timeframe SEBI allows. BusinessLine, citing PTI, reported the company had a cash reserve of ₹5,681 crore and no debt as of 31 March 2026.

Put the two halves of this piece together and the valuation gap makes sense. Public-market investors now have a listed benchmark that is profitable at the operating level (Blinkit) and another that is still losing money while growing (Instamart). A third player has to show either a path to Blinkit-like density or a different edge. Until it can, investors price in the risk.

What to watch next

  1. Instamart's Q3 margin. Swiggy says it expects operating margins to improve from here. If contribution margin moves back towards zero while growth holds, the "buy growth" bet looks better.
  2. Blinkit's store pace versus margin. Opening 300-plus stores a quarter costs money before those stores mature. If margins keep rising through that, the density flywheel is real.
  3. Zepto's updated financials. The addendum to its draft prospectus will show whether burn has fallen. Reports say the target listing window is February–May 2027.
  4. Advertising and non-grocery mix. These are the highest-margin parts of the basket and the clearest sign of pricing power.

The bottom line

Quick commerce in India is no longer a race to open the most stores fastest. It is a race to make each store as busy as possible. On that measure, Blinkit is ahead and pulling away, Instamart is paying to keep up, and Zepto is waiting until its numbers can make the case for its valuation. For brands, sellers and the people who work in these businesses, the stability of each platform now depends less on how quickly it delivers and more on how many orders each store can handle.

More in Consumer Internet & Quick Commerce and Startups & Funding. See our hubs for Eternal, Swiggy and Zepto.

Sources

Frequently asked questions

Is Blinkit profitable?

On an adjusted EBITDA basis, yes. Eternal reported ₹184 crore of adjusted EBITDA for Blinkit in Q2 FY27 (July–September 2026), or 0.9% of net order value. Adjusted EBITDA excludes items such as share-based payments, so it is not the same as net profit.

How much did Swiggy Instamart lose in Q2 FY27?

Swiggy reported an adjusted EBITDA loss of ₹895 crore for Instamart in Q2 FY27, up from ₹778 crore in Q1 FY27, though the loss as a share of gross order value improved slightly to -9.7%.

When is Zepto's IPO?

There is no date. Zepto filed an updated draft prospectus in June 2026, then paused the IPO and raised a pre-IPO round. The company has said it intends to list within the timeframe SEBI allows; reports put the target between February and May 2027.

Why does dark-store density matter so much?

A dark store has largely fixed costs: rent, staff, power and inventory. The more orders each store handles, the more of those costs each order can cover, and the more bargaining power the platform has with brands and advertisers.

Companies in this story

#quick-commerce#blinkit#instamart#zepto#unit-economics#dark-stores

Chetan

Every number we publish is sourced or clearly labelled as an estimate. How we report.

Read next